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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SAMUEL L. BOYD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

Argument Priority 15

HARMON CITY, INC., a Utah corporation,
MATTHEW HILTON, BRINTON BURBIDGE, KIRTON
McCONKIE & BUSHNELL, a Utah corporation
MICHAEL GOTTFREDSON, NIELSEN & SENIOR,
corporation, TERRY HARMON and
DOREEN HARMON,

Case

No.

960197-CA

Defendants-Appellees.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court
for Salt Lake County, Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Judge

ARGUMENT

Pursuant

to

Rule

24(c)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure, p l a i n t i f f and appellant Samuel L. Boyd ("Boyd") r e p l i e s
hereby to the d e f e n d a n t s ' - a p p e l l e e s ' b r i e f s and incorporates the
arguments s e t forth in his a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f .

With respect

to

those new matters r a i s e d by defendants and appellees in t h e i r four
respective

briefs,

Boyd supplements

his previous

arguments

as

follows. l
lr

The appellees-defendants served four separate b r i e f s on April 10, 1996,
April 12, 1996, April 15, 1996 and April 19, 1996. Defendants N i e l s e n and Hilton
(continued...)

1

JU

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DISMISSING BOYD'S
CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE,
L.

If

THERE IS NO UTAH CASE AFFIRMING A DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE UNDER RULE 41(b) MERELY UPON A SHOWING OF
INACTIVITY FOR A PERIOD AS SHORT AS TWENTY-ONE MONTHS.
INDEED. IN CASES SIMILAR TO THIS ACTION, THIS COURT HAS
HELD THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION.
this

Court

affirms

the

trial

court's

dismissal

with

prejudice of Boyd's claims, its decision will mark a fundamental
shift in Utah law applying Rule 41(b).

In each of the previous

cases affirming dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b), either
(1) the plaintiffs

failed to comply with court orders or were

guilty of some dilatory or otherwise culpable conduct, or (2) the
period of inactivity far exceeded the twenty-one month period at
issue here.

Because neither of these conditions is present here,

under existing case law, the trial court abused its discretion when
it dismissed this action with prejudice.

That decision should be

reversed.
Defendants argue in their briefs that Boyd fails to meet the
two-part test Utah courts use in analyzing whether to reverse a
trial

court's

dismissal

with

prejudice

under

Rule

41(b). 2

1

(...continued)
incorporated by reference the briefs filed by Kirton and Burbidge and by the
Harmon defendants. Kirton and Burbidge incorporated by reference the Harmon
defendants' brief. The Harmon defendants "primarily rely on the facts set forth
by Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell and Brinton R. Burbidge with respect to
Plaintiff's failure to prosecute" and certain additional facts.
Harmon
defendants' brief at 4. The Harmon defendants, however, have not incorporated
by reference the arguments of Kirton and Burbidge under Rule 24(h), Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, the Harmon defendants have not asserted any
arguments with respect to the trial court's abuse of discretion in dismissing the
case with prejudice under Rule 41(b). In any case, Boyd files this consolidated
brief in reply to all of the defendants' briefs.
2

See Charlie Brown Constr. Co. V. Leisure Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370
(Utah App.), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).

2

Defendants argue first that Boyd suffered no injustice, and second,
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the
case with prejudice under Rule 41(b).

Both of these contentions

miss the mark.
During all of the proceedings below and on defendants' motions
for summary affirmance at the Utah Supreme Court,3 defendants have
failed to cite any Utah case, and Boyd is aware of no Utah case, in
which any Utah

appellate court

has

affirmed

a dismissal

with

prejudice solely on the basis of a period of inactivity which was
as short as twenty-one months. Although Utah appellate courts have
affirmed Rule 41(b) dismissals where the period of inactivity was
as short as two years, the plaintiffs

in those cases, without

exception, had refused or failed to comply with orders of the trial
court or had engaged in some other affirmative misconduct that
justified the imposition of the ultimate sanction of dismissal with
prejudice.

See Charlie Brown Constr. Co., Inc. v. Leisure Sports,

Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (plaintiffs delayed 2 1/2
years to do discovery, failed to appear pursuant to an order to
show cause and then waited 8 months before moving to set aside the
dismissal); Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State Univ. Dept. of
Agriculture and Applied Science, 813 P.2d

1216

(Utah Ct. App.

1991)(plaintiffs failed to attend an order to show cause hearing or
take any action to move their second action along for nearly 2
years, which delay occurred after a separate trial court previously

The Utah Supreme Court denied defendants' motions for summary affirmance
in an order dated December 6, 1995.

3

had dismissed the case for failure to prosecute); Maxfield v.
Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah Ct. App.)/ cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33
(Utah

1989)(plaintiff

engaged

in a series of dilatory

actions

including multiple motions for continuances and other motions after
the case had been pending for nearly 7 years and the defendants had
filed a certificate of readiness for trial); Maxfield v. Fishier,
538 P.2d

1323

(Utah

1975)(fourteen-month

period

of

inactivity

coupled with plaintiff's dilatory motion to continue on the day of
trial because plaintiff still had not retained a crucial medical
expert) /
On the other hand, Rule 41(b) dismissals for mere inactivity
have been affirmed only for periods of complete inactivity far in
excess of the twenty-one months present here.

See Country Meadows

Convalescent Center v. Department of Health, 851 P.2d 1212 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993)(more than 5 years).
Indeed, Utah appellate courts have held, in cases similar to
the present case, that the trial court abused its discretion by
dismissing with prejudice.
1368,

1370

(Utah

See Johnson v. Firebrand, 571 P. 2d

1977)(dismissal

reversed

after

period

of

inactivity of over 4 years); Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul
W.

Larsen

Contractors,

Inc.,

544

P.2d

876,

879

(Utah

1975)

(dismissal reversed despite a lack of formal activity of more than
15 months).

Fishier subsequently was questioned in Johnson v. Firebrand, 571 P.2d 136 8
(Utah 1977), where the Court stated that the trial court should have allowed the
plaintiff the opportunity to put on his case without the expert. Id. at 1369.

4

Thus, under Utah law, a Rule 41(b) dismissal with prejudice
constitutes an abuse of discretion unless the plaintiff was guilty
of failing to comply with court orders or of some other dilatory or
culpable behavior or the period of inactivity was extraordinarily
long.

The defendants collectively have failed to demonstrate why

the trial court's Rule 41(b) dismissal would not be an abuse of
discretion in light of these principles.
have utterly

More importantly, they

failed to demonstrate that this case in any way

warrants a departure from those well-settled principles.
L.

BOYD HAS SUFFERED AN INJUSTICE.

Boyd complied with all Rules of Civil Procedure, all other
procedural rules and all court orders in this action.5
not

engage

in

any

type

of

misconduct

that

Boyd did

warranted

the

unprecipitated imposition of dismissal with prejudice.
Additionally, Boyd has sufficiently alleged several claims
against

the

significant
alleged

defendants
amounts

that

Harmon

that,

if

proved,

of money damages.
City

mishandled

would

give

rise

For example, Boyd
Harmon

City's

to
has

employees'

pension/ERISA funds before the sale of Harmon City's stock to Boyd
which resulted in a Consent Judgment being entered in the amount of
approximately
others.6

$4,000,000 against Harmon City, Terry Harmon and

Defendants' failure to timely disclose this liability,

5
A trial court "retains discretion to dismiss an action 'if a party fails
to move forward according to the rules and the direction of the court, without
justifiable excuse.'" Country Meadows, 851 P.2d at 1215 (emphasis added).

Record at 396, 123 (Addendum U); Record at 432-33, Answer to Request for
Admission No. 6 (Addendum V). Record at 670-700 (Addendum W) . The Utah Supreme
(continued...)

5

Boyd further a l l e g e s , breached the p a r t i e s ' agreements, c o n s t i t u t e d
s e c u r i t i e s fraud and caused Boyd to unnecessarily incur s i g n i f i c a n t
costs

and

expenses

which

would

not

have

been

incurred

had

defendants properly disclosed Harmon C i t y ' s m a t e r i a l l i a b i l i t i e s .
Involuntary dismissal of Boyd's claims c e r t a i n l y would prejudice
Boyd.
Against t h i s backdrop of prejudice to Boyd, Defendants claim
t h a t they have suffered countervailing prejudice which i s "amply
supported by c r e d i b l e evidence" in the record at 632-635, 647-58.
Burbidge and Kirton Brief a t 13.
Record

at

defendants'

632-635,

is

the

The a f f i d a v i t of Robert Morris,

putative

claim of p r e j u d i c e .

support

for

the

Harmon

However, Morris merely claims

summarily t h a t the insurance r a t i n g and c r e d i t r a t i n g of Harmon
City "has been affected",

Record a t 633, 515-6, and t h a t Harmon

C i t y ' s loan a p p l i c a t i o n s "have considered the pending matter".
The Morris a f f i d a v i t

omits to

s t a t e whether the r a t i n g s

adversely affected and if so, by how much.

Id.
were

Therefore, the alleged

prejudice to the Harmon defendants cannot outweigh the prejudice t o
Boyd if the dismissal i s

affirmed.

Similarly, defendants c i t e the a f f i d a v i t of John K. Mangum and
the t r i a l c o u r t ' s finding t h a t the "Court takes j u d i c i a l notice of
the fact t h a t the attorney-Defendants must maintain professional
6

(...continued)
Court r e c e n t l y a d j u d i c a t e d an appeal i n v o l v i n g t h e very same ERISA l i a b i l i t y
among Harmon C i t y , Terry Harmon and N i e l s e n . See Harmon C i t y , I n c . v . N i e l s e n
& S e n i o r , 907 P.2d 1162, 1166-67 (Utah 1995). The Court found t h a t ERISA d i d not
preempt t h e s t a t e law claims of t h e Harmon defendants and o t h e r s a g a i n s t N i e l s e n
and t h a t m a t e r i a l i s s u e s of f a c t p r e c l u d e d e n t r y of summary judgment i n favor of
N i e l s e n on Harmon C i t y , Terry Harmon and o t h e r s ' claims t h a t they had i n c u r r e d
ERISA l i a b i l i t y as a r e s u l t of N i e l s e n ' s a l l e g e d l e g a l m a l p r a c t i c e . .Id. a t 1172.

6

liability coverage and insurance" and that the "Court also takes
judicial notice of the fact that all Defendants must pay attorneys
to defend

them".

Findings

of

Fact

31-32,

Record

at

717-18.

However, the trial court's findings are inconsistent with Mangum's
affidavit which states, "When Nielsen & Senior was served with
process in this Utah action, Nielsen & Senior decided it would be
better off, at least for the present, incurring the cost of having
its own attorneys defend it rather than continue to pay attorney
fees and legal expenses under its remaining deductible."
650.

Accordingly, while Nielsen alleges that it has

Record at
incurred

attorney fees in defending this action, a significant portion of
those fees were incurred by Nielsen's own attorneys and apparently
Nielsen's insurer is not involved; both of these facts contained in
Mangum's affidavit demonstrate that the trial court's findings were
not supported.

Finally, the Kirton and Burbidge defendants have

not cited any record evidence supporting the trial court's finding
of prejudice as to them.
Thus, the trial court's abrupt dismissal of Boyd's claims
worked a substantial injustice to Boyd -- an injustice that is not
outweighed by any or all of the inconveniences defendants have
allegedly endured as a result of the pendency of this action.
Ci

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO
IMPLEMENT PROCEDURES TO MOVE THE CASE ALONG THAT WERE
LESS HARSH THAN DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE,

Defendants have alleged that Boyd failed to raise the issue of
whether the trial court failed to use one or more of the several
tools, including Rule 4-103, Utah Code of Judicial Administration,
7

to move the case forward and police its docket, any of which were
less drastic than dismissal with prejudice.

Kirton and Burbidge

brief at n.l.

However, this issue was raised in Boyd's objection

to

court's

the

trial

ruling.

Record

at

422-23.

Further,

defendants have alleged that this issue was not included in Boyd's
statement of issues in his initial brief.
brief at n.l.

Kirton and Burbidge

However, issue 3, as stated in Boyd's initial

brief, provides: "Whether the trial court abused its discretion,
which abuse resulted in injustice to Boyd, by dismissing Boyd's
claims

with

prejudice

despite

the

availability

of

numerous

procedures the trial court should have used to move the case along
that were
prejudice."

less

harsh

and more

equitable

dismissal

with

Boyd's Appellant's brief at 3-4. Finally, Boyd raised

this issue in his docketing statement.
8, 13.

than

See Docketing Statement at

Accordingly, this issue was raised and is properly before

the Court.
Kirton and Burbidge further argue that this argument is not
supported by case authority.

However, had a notice pursuant to

Rule 4-103 been sent by the trial court, Boyd respectfully submits
that the notice likely would have spurred both parties to action as
is evidenced by the discovery

filed by Boyd after defendants'

motion to dismiss was filed.

See Record at 443-579; Hartford

Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah App. 1994)(failure
to send plaintiff notice to appoint counsel

"would likely have

spurred Hartford to action, as demonstrated by the plethora of
legal documents filed by [plaintiff's counsel] concurrent with his
8

Notice of Appearance and in response to the State's Motion to
Dismiss.
in

court

It would indeed be unjust to deprive Hartford of its day
given

the

State's

failure

to

provide

the

required

notice.")
IL_

BOYD'S FILING OF A REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND
DISCOVERY IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FILING OF THE RULE 41(B)
MOTION BY SOME OF THE DEFENDANTS INDICATES THAT DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

In their briefs, the defendants have characterized

Boyd's

filing of a request for scheduling conference under Rule 16 and
written discovery after the filing of motions to dismiss an "an
obvious, last-chance attempt to fend off the ensuing dismissal, "
Kirton and Burbidge Brief at 18, an
invoke

the

dismissal,"

discovery

id., and a

defendants brief at 5.
bad

faith

process,"

or

some

id.

"eleventh hour attempt to
at

19, a

"ruse

"mad dash to the Courthouse."

to

avoid
Harmon

To the extent such characterizations imply

other

insidious

motive, Boyd

categorically

rejects them as litigation hyperbole devoid of factual foundation.
But to the extent such statements merely point out that Boya
took extraordinary efforts to demonstrate to the defendants and the
trial court his bona fide intentions regarding prosecuting the
case, Boyd concedes that such was his intent.

Nor does Boyd assert

that the timing of such activity, coming as it did immediately
after the filing of the attorney defendants' motions to dismiss,
was coincidental.

Nevertheless, responding in such a way cannot

properly be characterized as conduct that would strengthen the case
for dismissal with prejudice.

To the contrary, the message of that

activity, and that should have been received by the trial court,

9

was t h a t Boyd had no i n t e n t i o n of delaying or otherwise abusing the
j u d i c i a l process and was w i l l i n g , prepared and going forward.
The defendants further a s s e r t t h a t if a p l a i n t i f f were allowed
to stave off a Rule 41(b) dismissal by taking immediate e f f o r t s to
move the case along, "Rule 41(b) would have no meaning."
and Burbidge brief at 19.

Not so.

Kirton

Rule 41(b) i s not a r i g i d l y

defined procedure under which a defendant has a "vested r i g h t " to
dismissal a f t e r some a r b i t r a r i l y defined period of i n a c t i v i t y t h a t
the p l a i n t i f f

cannot defeat regardless of the circumstances.

the contrary,

the Rule 41(b) procedure i s f a c t - s p e c i f i c ,

To

case-

s e n s i t i v e , and can be invoked only upon the t r i a l c o u r t ' s exercise
of i t s d i s c r e t i o n upon consideration of the p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s .

In

cases such as t h i s , where the p r e d i c a t e for the invocation of Rule
41(b) can be mere i n a c t i v i t y , a Rule 41(b) procedure i s comparable
to an order t o show cause.

In such c a s e s , p l a i n t i f f s cannot be

faulted for taking a l l a v a i l a b l e steps to i n d i c a t e to the court
t h a t they are not f a i l i n g

and w i l l not f a i l

t o prosecute

the

matter, if given the opportunity. 7
In response t o Boyd's o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t t h e i r j o i n d e r i n t h e motion t o
d i s m i s s came a f t e r t h e p e r i o d of i n a c t i v i t y had ended, t h e Harmon defendants have
s t a t e d t h a t " P l a i n t i f f rushed t o t h e Courthouse t o f i l e a r e q u e s t for s c h e d u l i n g
conference" and t h a t t h e Harmons " j o i n e d i n t h e Motion one day a f t e r t h e
A p p e l l a n t ' s mad dash t o t h e Courthouse, [and] t h e Harmons j o i n e d i n t h e Motion
b e f o r e having r e c e i v e d anything from t h e P l a i n t i f f . " Harmon Defendants' b r i e f
a t 5, fh. These s t a t e m e n t s do not a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t t h e f a c t s and t h e r e c o r d
i n t h i s c a s e . The K i r t o n and Burbidge defendants f i l e d t h e i r Motion t o Dismiss
on January 26, 1996. Record a t 297-99. Boyd f i l e d h i s r e q u e s t for s c h e d u l i n g
conference on February 9, 1996. Record a t 327-328. Boyd f i l e d h i s o p p o s i t i o n
memorandum t o t h e K i r t o n and Burbidge Motion on February 9, 1996. Record a t 31926. On February 13, 1996, 4 days a f t e r Boyd f i l e d h i s r e q u e s t for s c h e d u l i n g
conference and 18 days a f t e r K i r t o n and Burbidge f i l e d t h e i r motion, t h e Harmon
defendants f i l e d t h e i r Motion t o D i s m i s s . Record a t 3 3 1 . Accordingly, i t i s
simply not a c c u r a t e for t h e Harmon defendants t o a s s e r t t h a t they " j o i n e d i n t h e
Motion one day a f t e r A p p e l l a n t ' s mad dash t o t h e Courthouse". In any c a s e , t h e
(continued...)
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E.

THE PARTIES HAD SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS TWELVE MONTHS
BEFORE THE TIME DEFENDANTS FILED THEIR MOTIONS TO
DISMISS.

Boyd respectfully submits that the trial court's finding that
there were no settlement discussions was not supported.8
Boyd

further

submits

that the trial court erred

by

Indeed,
summarily

rejecting the Jones' affidavit on a motion to dismiss, particularly
where the Jones' affidavit shows the existence of the settlement
negotiations

by

the

parties.

In

light

of

such

settlement

discussions which occurred twelve months before the filing of a
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, Boyd submits that it
was improper for the trial court to dismiss Boyd's claims with
prejudice.
Defendants further argue that Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P. 2d
1135, 1137 (Utah 1977), and its reversal of a dismissal under Ruld
41(b), is distinguishable.

Defendants argue that in Utah Oil there

had been some activity initiated by plaintiff in the case before
the inactivity and subsequent dismissal.

However, defendants cite

no language from Utah Oil which supports this argument.
II-

THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF BOYD'S FOURTH CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE UTAH SECURITIES ACT SHOULD
BE REVERSED.

In reply to the defendants' arguments

regarding

the Rule

12(b)(6) dismissal of Boyd's fourth cause of action for damages

7

( ...continued)
Harmon defendants have not explained why, given filing of their Rule 41(b) motion
after the period of inactivity had ended, they were entitled to dismissal even
if the dismissal as to the other defendants is affirmed.
8
See Finding of Fact 119, Record at 716, Record at 804-805, 812-13
(Addendum Y at 7-8, 15-16); 393-94, 17 (Addendum U); 400, f4(Addendum X ) .
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under the Utah Securities Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 et seq.
(the "Act"), Boyd supplements Section II of Appellant's brief as
follows.
A,.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULE 41(B) DISMISSAL DOES NOT DEPRIVE
BOYD OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL
OF HIS SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIM.

The defendants argue that this Court should refuse to consider
Boyd's appeal regarding the securities fraud claim if this Court
agrees that the Rule 41(b) dismissal was entered properly.
and Burbidge brief at 22-24.
asserted,

that

the

Rule

Kirton

Assuming, as the defendants have

41(b)

dismissal

"operates

as

an

adjudication upon the merits of the case," id. at 24, such an
adjudication would finalize the trial court's disposition of the
case, entitling Boyd to appeal both from the interlocutory Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal of the securities fraud claim as well as the
Rule 41(b) dismissal.

It would not legally operate as a bar to

Boyd's appeal of earlier decisions of the trial court regarding
interlocutory matters.
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure grants to
district court litigants the right to appeal "from all final orders
and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law."

Rule 54(b) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in turn, specifies that
when more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action . . . the court may direct the entry of a final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims . . . only upon an express determination by the
court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment.
In the
absence of such determination and direction, any order or
other form of decision, however designated, which
adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . shall not
terminate the action as to any of the claims, and the
12

order or other form of decision is subject to revision at
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all
the claims and the rights and liabilities of the parties.
(Emphasis added).
In this case, the trial court did not make a Rule 54(b)
determination about the dismissal of the securities fraud claim.
Therefore, under Rule 54(b), that decision was not a final judgment
from which Boyd earlier could have appealed.

In fact, and assuming

the Rule 41(b) dismissal with prejudice was properly entered, it
was not until after the time of that dismissal that any aspect of
the case would have been ripe for appeal.
Notwithstanding these procedural constraints, the defendants
argue that the very same Rule 41(b) dismissal that gave rise to
Boyd's appeal of right simultaneously barred it.

The procedural

rules do not, however, place Boyd in such an inequitable quandary;
nor do (or could) defendants assert that this Court is without
jurisdiction to consider the appeal.
The

cases

cited

by the defendants

do

not

stand

for

the

proposition that a Rule 41(b) dismissal of Boyd's claims, even if
affirmed by this Court, would justify this Court in forfeiting
Boyd's right to appeal from prior, interlocutory rulings.
First, in Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1989),
the court held that, in light of its affirmance of a Rule 41(b)
dismissal, it did not need to address the plaintiff's claim that
the trial court had erred in denying a motion for summary judgment.
Id. at 241.

However, by the time of the Rule 41(b) ruling in that

action, the plaintiff already had unsuccessfully tried to appeal
from the denial of a summary judgment motion.
13

id. at 239-240.

This important opportunity Boyd has not yet had. More importantly,
the dismissal was entered sua sponte on the eve of a trial date
that already had been postponed several times by the plaintiff and
after nearly a decade of dilatory conduct by plaintiff that rose to
the level of "abuse of the judicial process."

id. at 241.

Boyd

has been guilty of no such dilatory conduct and should not be
penalized additionally by losing his right to appeal the dismissal
of the securities fraud claim.
Second, in Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584
(Utah App.

1990),

the Court

of Appeals

affirmed

an order of

dismissal under Rule 37(d) as a sanction for failure to respond to
discovery requests and, given that decision, declined to consider
the plaintiffs' appeal from a grant of summary judgment for the
defendants.
Schoney.

.Id. at 587.

No Rule 41(b) dismissal was involved in

More importantly, Schoney is inapplicable because the

defendant had simultaneously moved for summary judgment and for
dismissal under Rule 37(d).

Therefore, as the court correctly

observed, because the dismissal under Rule 37(b) was "sufficient,
by itself, to dispose of the case," the propriety of the summary
judgment motion was not addressed.

Id..

In the present case, the

dismissal under Rule 41(b) followed the dismissal of the securities
fraud claim by 2 years and could not conceivably be an alternate,
contemporaneous adjudication of the securities fraud issue.
Finally, Country Meadows Convalescent Center v. Department of
Health, 851 P.2d 1212 (Utah App. 1993), is inapposite.

There, the

court affirmed a Rule 41(b) dismissal that followed a five-year
14

period of inactivity and therefore declined to consider the trial
court's treatment of a summary judgment motion.

Xd. at 1217.

Importantly, however, the motion for summary judgment from which
the plaintiff

appealed had been filed several weeks after the

motion to dismiss under Rule 41(b).

Jd. at 1214.

Here, the trial

court's dismissal of the securities fraud claim preceded the Rule
41(b) motion by about two years.
Applicable
interlocutory

court

appeal

rules
from

the

precluded
trial

Boyd

court's

from

taking

dismissal

securities fraud claim until final judgment was entered.

of

an
his

It is

grossly unfair to suggest, as Defendants do, that having received
final judgment in the form of a Rule 41(b) dismissal, Boyd's right
to appeal the dismissal of the securities fraud claim now has been
lost solely because of the procedural form of that final judgment.
B^

BOYD HAS STANDING UNDER THE ACT.

This Court recently has held that "[p]otential purchasers or
mere offerees do not have a cause of action" under the Act.
v. Warrington, 877 P.2d 1245, 1246 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Levitz
Relying

on Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), this
Court

determined

that,

to

have

standing

plaintiff must be an "actual purchaser."

under

the

Act,

the

id. at 1247.

In order to be an "actual purchaser," however, a party need
not have legal title to securities or even consummate a sale of
securities.

The United States Supreme Court acknowledged in Blue

Chip Stamps that even an executory contract pertaining to the sale
of

securities will

grant

standing
15

under

Rule

10b-5 under

the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

421 U.S. at 748.

This majority

view has been acknowledged by this Court. Levitz, 877 P. 2d at 1247
n. 5.

Apparently

accepting

that

an executory

contract

for

the

purchase of s e c u r i t i e s w i l l grant standing under the Act,

the

Defendants a s s e r t t h a t Boyd did not a l l e g e "that an actual c o n t r a c t
to purchase was e n t e r e d . "

Harmon defendants' b r i e f at 11.

a s s e r t i o n i s simply i n c o n s i s t e n t with the record.

This

At paragraph 16

of his Amended Complaint, Boyd alleged as follows:
In the l a t e spring of 1986, NINI [Boyd's predecessor in
i n t e r e s t ] was induced . . . t o e n t e r i n t o an agreement
by which NINI would purchase 100% of the common stock of
Harmon City from Harmon C i t y ' s shareholders in order to
obtain the a s s e t s and operations of the harmon City
grocery chain. A l e t t e r agreement was executed.
R. at 12.

By t h i s paragraph, Boyd c l e a r l y alleged the existence of

an executory c o n t r a c t for the purchase of shares of Harmon City.
And d e s p i t e the defendants' present p r o t e s t a t i o n s , in considering
a motion t o dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),

the t r i a l

court was

obligated t o accept the facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint.
Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989).
Accordingly, for purposes of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s a n a l y s i s , Boyd was
an "actual purchaser" for purposes of the Act. 9

9

Even were t h e Court, applying t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s t a n d a r d of review, a b l e t o
c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e p a r t i e s p r e s e n t l y d i s p u t e t h e l e g a l e f f e c t of t h e l e t t e r
agreement p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e s e c u r i t i e s p u r c h a s e , t h a t l e g a l u n c e r t a i n t y would not
p r e c l u d e a c t u a l p u r c h a s e r s t a t u s . See, e . g . , Mullen v . Sweetwater Dev. C o r p . ,
619 F. Supp. 809, 815 (D. Colo. 1985) ("To exclude a c o n t r a c t t o purchase s t o c k
on t h e ground t h a t i t s e n f o r c e a b i l i t y i s d i s p u t e d would allow a p a r t y t o d e f e a t
any claim a s s e r t e d a g a i n s t i t merely by c h a l l e n g i n g t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e
contract") .

16

Additionally, the Birnbaum rule, as Defendants have referred
to it, is not mechanically applied such that a plaintiff will never
have standing to bring a securities fraud case unless there has
been consideration paid and received and share certificates issued.
For example, in Grubb v. FDIC,

868 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1989), a

case featured in the Harmon defendants' brief, the court held that
the plaintiff had standing to bring a Rule 10b-5 claim even though
he personally had not purchased any securities.
In Grubb, the plaintiff, a natural

id. at 1161-62.

person, borrowed money

to

organize and capitalize a holding company that then purchased a
third-party bank in reliance on representations of the defendant
bank.

Because of the incurrence of this obligation, the plaintiff

was the "actual party at risk in the transaction."
Moreover,

the

specifically

policy

concerns

animating

the

id. at 1161.

Birnbaum

rule,

(i) the desire not to allow "mere bystanders to a

securities transaction" a cause of action, and (ii) the desire to
avoid speculative and conjectural evidence, were not implicated.
Id. at 1161-62; see also Banco Nacional De Costa Rica v. Bremar
Holdings Corp., 492 F. Supp. 364, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Birnbaum
rule

did

securities

not bar

claim

fraud claim

by

guarantor

of

notes

against maker of

notes

from

asserting

even though

it

technically purchased no securities; claim nevertheless was based
on a "concrete" transaction resulting in damages capable of precise
calculation).

17

C.

UNDER THE ACT, BOYD MAY RECOVER THE OUT-OF-POCKET LOSSES
HE SUSTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE DEFENDANTS' VIOLATION OF
THE ACT.

Upon a showing that a defendant has violated the Act, the Act
specifies that the plaintiff may "sue either at law or in equity to
recover the consideration paid for the security" together with
statutory interest, costs and legal fees less the amount of any
income derived
22(1)(a).

from

the

securities.

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-

This provision does not purport, however, to be an

exhaustive and exclusive list of remedies available for violation
of the Act.

Nor have Utah courts so construed it.

As the Defendants have explained, the Act "must be interpreted
and

administered

consistently

'with

the

federal

regulation.'"

Harmon defendants' brief at 10 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27).
Under federal law, one of the types of damages recoverable upon a
showing of a violation of Rule 10b-5 is consequential or incidental
damages.

See, e.g., Zeller v. Boaue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d

795,

(2d Cir.)

803

(Friendly,

J.)

(consequential

damages

are

recoverable under the Exchange Act if plaintiff "establish[es] the
causal nexus with a good deal of certainty"), cert, denied, 414
U.S. 908 (1973); Grubb v. FDIC, 868 F.2d at 1162 (awarding damages
under

Rule

10b-5

based

not

on

value

of

securities

but

on

plaintiff's out-of-pocket expenses).
Given the similarities between Section 61-1-22 of the Act and
Rule 10b-5, and in light of the foregoing authorities, Boyd should
be allowed to recover the amounts he spent in reliance in the

18

representations of the Defendants in connection with the agreement
for the sale of the Harmon City Stock.
CONCLUSION
The defendants have failed to demonstrate that a fundamental
and significant shift in Utah law pertaining to Rule 41(b) is
warranted in these circumstances.

Under existing law, the trial

court abused its discretion by dismissing with prejudice Boyd's
claims solely upon the basis of a 21-month period of inactivity.
Utah appellate courts have repeatedly held that dismissal with
prejudice

is

disfavored.

a

harsh

and

permanent

result

that

should

be

This case is uniquely ill-suited for the application

of that harsh procedure.

Additionally, the trial court erred as a

matter of law in concluding that Boyd had failed to state a claim
under the Utah Securities Act.
In light of the foregoing, Boyd respectfully requests that the
Court reverse the trial court's decision to dismiss Boyd's claims
with

prejudice

and

remand

to

the

trial

court

for

additional

proceedings.
DATED this 22nd day of May, 1996.
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAFl

Je'f'frey M. Jones
J/Mark Gibb
Attorneys for Samuel L. Boyd
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of May, 1996, I caused
two copies of the foregoing to be mailed in the U.S. Mail, firstclass, postage prepaid, to the following:
Arthur H. Nielsen
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & Senior
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Blake T. Ostler
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendants Harmon City, Inc.
Terry Harmon and Doreen Harmon
1800 Eagle Gate Plaza
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Thomas L. Kay
SNELL & WILMER
Attorney for Defendants Kirton and Burbidge
111 East Broadway #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Glenn C. Hanni
STRONG & HANNI
Attorney for Defendant Matthew Hilton
600 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

jmg/boydre.br f
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ADDENDA
In addition to the Addenda A-Z previously attached to the
Appellant's Brief, Boyd attaches the following for the
convenience of the Court:
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

Addendum 1

Rule 10b-5, Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Addendum 2

Section 61-1-22, -28

Addendum 3

facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal that show the
claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The affidavits
shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered
by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. A response shall be filed within 20 days after the
motion is filed. Any reply shall be filed within 10 days after the
response is filed.
(c) Order of the court. Upon consideration of the motion,
affidavits, and memoranda, the court may order that the case
be temporarily remanded to the trial court for the purpose of
entering findings of fact relevant to the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. If it appears to the appellate court that
the attorney of record on the appeal faces a conflict of interest
upon remand, the court shall direct that counsel withdraw
and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or
retained.
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for
briefs shall be vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand
under this rule. Other procedural steps required by these
rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand, unless a stay
is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the
parties or upon the court's motion.
(e) Proceedings before the trial court Upon remand
the trial court shall conduct hearings and take evidence as
necessary to enter the findings of fact necessary to determine
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Evidentiary
hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as
practicable after remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be
upon the proponent of the fact The standard of proof shall be
a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court shall enter
written findings of fact.
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the
conclusion of all proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of
the tria) court and the court reporter shaB prepare the record
of the supplemental proceedings as required by these rules. If
the record of the original proceedings before the trial court has
been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial
court shall immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon preparation of the supplemental record.
If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court
has not been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of
the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental
proceedings upon the preparation of the entire record.
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the
record from the trial court, the clerk of the court shall notify
the parties of the new schedule for briefing or oral argument
under these rules. Errors claimed to have been made during
the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors
in other appeals. The findings of fact entered pursuant to this
rule are reviewable under the same standards as the review of
findings of fact in other appeals.
(Added effective October 1,1992.)
Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Briefofthe appellant The briefofthe appellant shall
contain under appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the
court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal
contains the names of all such parties. The list should be
set out on a separate page which appears immediately
inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the
addendum, with page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically
arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and
other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the
brief where they are cited.

(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the
appellate court
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review,
including for each issue, the standard of appellate review
with supporting authority; and
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue
was preserved in the trial court; or
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an
issue not preserved in the trial court.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances,
rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal
shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If
the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation
alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an
addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first
indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A
statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for
review shall follow. All statements of fact and references
to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to
the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule.
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the
brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading
under which the argument is arranged.
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the
issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief
sought.
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no
addendum is necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so
makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is
bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of
contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or
regulation of central importance cited in the brief but
not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(B) any court opinion of central importance to the
appeal but not available to the court as part of a
regularly published reporter service; and
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of
central importance to the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision,
the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the
contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall
conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule,
except that the appellee need not include:
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the
appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant. The appellee
may refer to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to
the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has crossappealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response
of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal.
Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set
forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall
conform to the requirements of paragraph (aX2), (3), (9), and

Addendum l
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(10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed except with
leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be
expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to ^
minimum references to parties by such designations as aap^
pellant" and "appellee.* It promotes clarity to use the designa^
tions used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or
the actua/names orparties, or descriptive terms sucn as itfe
employee," "the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall
be made to the pages of the original record as paginated
pursuant to Rule 1Kb) or to pages of any statement of the
evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursue
ant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to exhibits shall be made
to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the
admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be
k
made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was
identified, offered, and received or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court,
principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefe
shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the
table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross,
appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be
deemed the appellant for the purposes of this rule and Rule 26,
unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise
orders. The brief of the appellee shall contain the issues and
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer
to the brief of the appellant.
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or
appellees. In cases involving more than one appellant or
appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the
appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and
any appellant </r appellee may adapt byrefe&ace any part at
the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs,
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a
party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral
argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the
citations. An original letter and nine copies shall befiledin the
Supreme Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be
filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either
to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state
the reasons for the supplemental citations. Any response shall
be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited,
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this
rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome,
irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on
motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess
attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
(k) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy
cover stock and shall comply with Rule 27.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994.)
Rule 25. Brief of an amicus curiae or guardian ad
litem.
A brief of an amicus curiae or of a guardian ad litem
representing a minor who is not a party to the appeal may be
filed only if accompanied by written consent of all parties, or
by leave of court granted on motion or at the request of the
.court. A motion for leave shall identify the interest of the
Applicant and shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus
curiae or the guardian ad litem is desirable. Except as all
parties otherwise consent, an amicus curiae or guardian ad
litem shall file its brief within the time allowed the party
whose position as to affirmance or reversal the amicus curiae

ritL/L/ILJJUtt.&

or guardian ad litem will support, unless the court for cause
shown otherwise orders. A motion of an amicus cunae or
guardian ad litem to participate in the oral argument will be
granted when circumstances warrant in the court's discretion.
Rule 26. Filing and service of briefs.
(a) Time for serving and filing briefs. The appellant
shall serve and die a brief within 40 days after date of no dice
from the clerk of the appellate court pursuant to Rule 13,
unless a motion for summary disposition of the appeal or ^
motion to remand for determination of ineffective assistance of
counsel has been previously interposed, in which event service
and filing shall be within 30 days from the denial of such
motion. The appellee shall serve and file a brief within 30 days
after service of the appellant's brief. A reply brief may be
served and filed by the appellant. If a reply brief is filed, it
shall be served and filed within 30 days after the filing and
service of the appellee's brief. If oral argument is scheduled
fewer than 35 days after the filing of appellee's brief, the reply
brief must be filed at least 5 days prior to oral argument. By
stipulation filed with the court, the parties may extend each of
such periods for no more than 30 days in civil cases or 15 days
in criminal cases. A motion for enlargement of time need not
accompany the stipulation. No such stipulation shall be effec>
tive unless it is filed prior to the expiration of the period
sought to be extended.
(b) Number of copies to be filed and served. For mat.
ters pending in the Supreme Court, ten copies of each brief,
one of which shall contain an original signature, shall be filed
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. For matters pending it\
the Court of Appeals, eight copies of each brief, one of which
shall contain an original signature, shall be filed with the
Clerk of the Court of Appeals. Two copies shall be served or*
counsel for each party separately represented.
(c) Consequence of failure to file briefs. If an appellant
fails to file a brief within the time provided in this rule, or
within the time as may be extended by order of the appellate
court, an appellee may move for dismissal of the appeal. If an
appellee fails to file a brief within the time provided by this,
rule, or within the time as may be extended by order of the
appellate court, an appellant may move that the appellee not
be heard at oral argument.
(d) Return of record to the clerk. Each party, upon the
filing of its brief, shall return the record to the clerk of the
court having custody pursuant to these rules.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994.)
Rule 27. Form of briefs.
(a) Paper size; printing and spacing. Briefs shall be
typewritten, printed or prepared by photocopying or othe*
duplicating or copying process that will produce clear, blacl^
and permanent copies equally legible to printing, in type not;
smaller than ten characters per inch, on opaque, unglazed
paper 8 Vi inches wide and 11 inches long, and shall be
securely bound along the left margin. Paper may be recycled
paper, with or without deinking. The impression must be
double spaced, except for matter customarily single spaced
and indented, with adequate margins on the top and sides of
each page.
(b) Binding. Briefs shall be printed on both sides of the
page, and bound with a compact-type binding so as not unduly
to increase the thickness of the brief along the bound side.
Coiled plastic and spiral-type bindings are not acceptable.
(c) Color of cover; contents of cover. The cover of the
brief of appellant shall be blue; that of appellee, red; that or
intervenor, guardian ad litem, or amicus curiae, green; that or
any reply brief, gray; that of any petition for rehearing, tanthat of any response to a petition for rehearing, white; that or
a petition for certiorari, white; that of a response to a petition
for certiorari, orange; and that of a reply to the response to a

SEC Rule 10b-5
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 [Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices]
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a)

to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,

(b)

to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or

(c)

to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.

Addendum 2

61-1-22. Sales and purchases in violation — Remedies
— Limitation of actions.
(1) (a) A person who offers or sells a security in violation of
Subsection 61-1-3(1), Section 61-1-7, Subsection 61-117(2), any rule or order under Section 61-1-15, which
requires the affirmative approval of sales literature before
it is used, any condition imposed under Subsection 61-110(4) or 61-1-11(7), or offers, sells, or purchases a security
in violation of Subsection 61-1-1(2) is liable to the person
selling the security to or buying the security from him,
who may sue either at law or in equity to recover the
consideration paid for the security, together with interest
at 12% per year from the date of payment, costs, and
reasonable attorney's fees, less the amount of any income
received on the security, upon the tender of the security or
for damages if he no longer owns the security.
(b) Damages are the amount that would be recoverable
upon a tender less the value of the security when the
buyer disposed of it and interest at 12% per yearfromthe
date of disposition.
(2) The court in a suit brought under Subsection (1) may
award an amount equal to three times the consideration paid
for the security, together with interest, costs, and attorney's
fees, less any amounts, all as specified in Subsection (1) upon
a showing that the violation was reckless or intentional
(3) A person who offers or sells a security in violation of
Subsection 61-1-1(2) is not liable under Subsection dXa) if the
purchaser knew of the untruth or omission, or the seller did
not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known of the untrue statement or misleading omission.
(4) (a) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a
seller or buyer liable under Subsection (1), every partner,
officer, or director of such a seller or buyer, every person
occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, every employee of such a seller or buyer who
materially aids in the sale or purchase, and every brokerdealer or agent who materially aids in the sale are also
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as
the seller or purchaser, unless the nonseller or
nonpurchaser who is so liable sustains the burden of proof
that he did not know, and in exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of the existence of the facts by
reason of which the liability is alleged to exist.
(b) There is contribution as in cases of contract among
the several persons so liable.

Addendum 3

(5) Any tender specified in this section may be made at any
time before entry of judgment.
(6) A cause of action under this section survives the death of
any person who might have been a plaintiff or defendant.
(7) (a) No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability under this section unless brought before the expiration
of four years after the act or transaction constituting the
violation or the expiration of two years after the discovery
by the plaintiff of the facts constituting the violation,
whichever expires first.
(b) No person may sue under this section if:
(i) the buyer or seller received a written offer,
before suit and at a time when he owned the security,
to refund the consideration paid together with interest at 12% per year from the date of payment, less the
amount of any income received on the security, and he
failed to accept the offer within 30 days of its receipt;
or
(ii) the buyer or seller received such an offer before
suit and at a time when he did not own the security,
unless he rejected the offer in writing within 30 days
of its receipt.
(8) No person who has made or engaged in the performance
of any contract in violation of this chapter or any rule or order
hereunder, or who has acquired any purported right under any
such contract with knowledge of the facts by reason of which
its making or performance was in violation, may base any suit
on the contract.
(9) A condition, stipulation, or provision binding a person
acquiring a security to waive compliance with this chapter or
a rule or order hereunder is void.
(10) (a) The rights and remedies provided by this chapter
are in addition to any other rights or remedies that may
exist at law or in equity.
(b) This chapter does not create any cause of action not
specified in this section or Subsection 61-1-4(5).
mi

61-1-27. Construction of chapter.
This chapter may be so construed as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact
it and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of
this chapter with the related federal regulation.
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